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Abstract
While machine learning (ML) models are being increasingly
trusted to make decisions in different and varying areas, the
safety of systems using such models has become an increasing
concern. In particular, ML models are often trained on data
from potentially untrustworthy sources, providing adversaries
with the opportunity to manipulate them by inserting carefully
crafted samples into the training set. Recent work has shown
that this type of attack, called a poisoning attack, allows adver-
saries to insert backdoors or trojans into the model, enabling
malicious behavior with simple external backdoor triggers at
inference time and only a blackbox perspective of the model
itself. Detecting this type of attack is challenging because
the unexpected behavior occurs only when a backdoor trig-
ger, which is known only to the adversary, is present. Model
users, either direct users of training data or users of pre-trained
model from a catalog, may not guarantee the safe operation of
their ML-based system. In this paper, we propose a novel ap-
proach to backdoor detection and removal for neural networks.
Through extensive experimental results, we demonstrate its ef-
fectiveness for neural networks classifying text and images. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first methodology capa-
ble of detecting poisonous data crafted to insert backdoors and
repairing the model that does not require a verified and trusted
dataset.
1 Introduction
The ability of machine learning (ML) to identify patterns in
complex data sets has led to large-scale proliferation of ML
models in business and consumer applications. However, at
present, ML models and the systems that use them are not cre-
ated in a way to ensure safe operation when deployed. While
quality is often assured by evaluating performance on a test
set, malicious attacks must also be considered. Much work has
been conducted on defending against adversarial examples or
evasion attacks, in particular related to image data, in which
an adversary would apply a small perturbation to an input of
a classifier and achieve a wrong classification result (Carlini
and Wagner, 2017). However, the training process itself may
also expose vulnerabilities to adversaries. Organizations de-
ploying ML models often do not control the end-to-end pro-
cess of data collection, curation, and training the model. For
example, training data is often crowdsourced (e.g., Amazon
Mechanical Turk, Yelp reviews, Tweets) or collected from cus-
tomer behavior (e.g., customer satisfaction ratings, purchasing
history, user traffic). It is also common for users to build on
and deploy ML models designed and trained by third parties.
In these scenarios, adversaries may be able to alter the model’s
behavior by manipulating the data that is used to train it. Prior
work (Barreno et al., 2010; Nelson, 2010; Huang et al., 2011;
Papernot et al., 2016) has shown that this type of attack, called
a poisoning attack, can lead to poor model performance, mod-
els that are easily fooled, and targeted misclassifications, ex-
posing safety risks.
One recent and particularly insidious type of poisoning at-
tack generates a backdoor or trojan in a deep neural network
(DNN) (Gu et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017a,b). DNNs compro-
mised in this manner perform very well on standard validation
and test samples, but behave badly on inputs having a spe-
cific backdoor trigger. For example, Gu et al. (2017) generated
a backdoor in a street sign classifier by inserting images of
stop signs with a special sticker (the backdoor trigger) into the
training set and labeling them as speed limits. The model then
learned to properly classify standard street signs, but misclas-
sify stop signs possessing the backdoor trigger. Thus, by per-
forming this attack, adversaries are able to trick the model into
classifying any stop sign as a speed limit simply by placing a
sticker on it, causing potential accidents in self-driving cars.
As ML adoption increases in critical applications, we need
methods to defend against backdoor and other poisoning at-
tacks.
While backdoor attacks and evasion attacks both trigger mis-
classifications by the model, backdoor attacks provide adver-
saries with full power over the backdoor key that generates
misclassification. In contrast, the perturbations made to adver-
sarial examples are specific to the input and/or model. Thus, a
backdoor attack enables the adversary to choose whatever per-
turbation is most convenient for triggering misclassifications
(e.g. placing a sticker on a stop sign). In contrast to standard
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evasion attacks, however, the adversary must have some abil-
ity to manipulate the training data to execute a poisoning at-
tack.
Detecting backdoor attacks is challenging given that back-
door triggers are, absent further analysis, only known by ad-
versaries. Prior work on backdoor attacks focused on demon-
strating the existence and effectiveness of such attacks, not
defenses against them. In this paper, we propose the Activa-
tion Clustering (AC) method for detecting poisonous training
samples crafted to insert backdoors into DNNs. This method
analyzes the neural network activations of the training data to
determine whether it has been poisoned, and, if so, which dat-
apoints are poisonous.
Our contributions are the following:
• We propose the first methodology for detecting poisonous
data maliciously inserted into the training set to generate
backdoors that does not require verified and trusted data.
Additionally, we have released this method as a part of the
open source IBM Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (Nicolae
et al., 2018).
• We demonstrate that the AC method is highly successful at
detecting poisonous data in different applications by evalu-
ating it on three different text and image datasets.
• We demonstrate that the AC method is robust to complex
poisoning scenarios in which classes are multimodal (e.g.
contain sub-populations) and multiple backdoors are in-
serted.
2 Related Work
In this section, we briefly describe the literature on poisoning
attacks and defenses on neural networks, focusing on backdoor
attacks in particular.
Attacks: Yang et al. (2017) described how generative neural
networks could be used to craft poisonous data that maxi-
mizes the error of the trained classifier, while Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez
et al. (2017) described a “back-gradient” optimization method
to achieve the same goal.
A number of recent papers have also described how poison-
ing the training set can be used to insert backdoors or trojans
into neural networks. Gu et al. (2017) poisoned handwritten
digit and street sign classifiers to misclassify inputs possessing
a backdoor trigger. Additionally, Liu et al. (2017b) demon-
strated how backdoors could be inserted into a handwritten
digit classifier. Finally, Liu et al. (2017a) showed how to ana-
lyze an existing neural network to devise triggers that are more
easily learned by the network and demonstrate the efficacy of
this method on a number of systems including facial recog-
nition, speech recognition, sentence attitude recognition, and
auto driving.
Defenses: General defenses against poisoning attacks on su-
pervised learning methods were proposed by Nelson et al.
(2009) and Baracaldo et al. (2017). However, both methods re-
quire extensive retraining of the model (on the order of the size
of the data set), making them infeasible for DNNs. Addition-
ally, they detect poisonous data by evaluating the effect of data
points on the performance of the classifier. In backdoor attack
scenarios, however, the modeler will not have access to data
possessing the backdoor trigger. Thus, while these methods
may work for poisoning attacks aimed at reducing overall per-
formance, they are not applicable to backdoor attacks.
Steinhardt et al. (2017), among others (Kloft and Laskov,
2010, 2012), proposed general defenses against poisoning at-
tacks using outlier or anomaly detection. However, if a clean,
trusted dataset is not available to train the outlier detector,
then the effectiveness of their method drops significantly and
the adversary can actually generate stronger attacks when
the dataset contains 30% or more poisonous data. Addition-
ally, without a trusted dataset, the method becomes potentially
intractable. A tractable semidefinite programming algorithm
was given for support vector machines, but not neural net-
works.
Liu et al. (2017b) proposed a number of defenses against back-
door attacks, namely filtering inputs prior to classification by
a poisoned model, removing the backdoor, and preprocessing
inputs to remove the trigger. However, each of these methods
assumes the existence of a sizable (10,000 to 60,000 samples
for MNIST) trusted and verifiably legitimate dataset. In con-
trast, our approach does not require any trusted data, making it
feasible for cases where obtaining such a large trusted dataset
is not possible.
In Liu et al. (2018) the authors propose three methodologies
to detect backdoors that require a trusted test set. Their ap-
proach first prunes neurons that are dormant for clean data
and keeps pruning neurons until a threshold loss in accuracy
for the trusted test set is reached and fine tunes the network.
Their approach differs to ours in the following. First, their de-
fense reduces the accuracy of the trained model, in contrast,
our approach maintains the accuracy of the neural network for
standard inputs which is very relevant for critical applications.
Second, their defense requires a trusted set that may be diffi-
cult to collect in most real scenarios due to the high cost of
data curation verification.
3 Threat Model and Terminology
We consider an adversary who wants to manipulate a machine
learning model to uniquely misclassify inputs that contain a
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backdoor key, while classifying other inputs correctly. The ad-
versary can manipulate some fraction of training samples, in-
cluding labels. However, s/he cannot manipulate the training
process or final model. Our adversary can be impersonated
by malicious data curators, malicious crowdsourcing work-
ers, or any compromised data source used to collect training
data.
More concretely, consider a dataset Dtrain = X,Y that has
been collected from potentially untrusted sources to train a
DNN FΘ. The adversary wants to insert one or more back-
doors into the DNN, yielding FΘP 6= FΘ. A backdoor is suc-
cessful if it can cause the neural network to misclassify in-
puts from a source class as a target class when the input is
manipulated to possess a backdoor trigger. The backdoor trig-
ger is generated by a function fT that takes as input a sam-
ple i drawn from distribution Xsource and outputs fT (i), such
that FΘP (fT (i)) = t, where t is the target label/class. In this
case, fT (i) is the input possessing the backdoor trigger. How-
ever, for any input j that does not contain a backdoor trigger,
FΘP (j) = FΘ(j). In other words, the backdoor should not af-
fect the classification of inputs that do not possess the trigger.
Hence, an adversary inserts multiple samples fT (x ∈ Xsource)
all labeled as the targeted class. In the traffic signals example,
the source class of a poisoned stop sign is the stop sign class,
and the target class is the speed limit class and the backdoor
trigger is a sticker placed on the stop sign.
4 Case Studies
Before we present the details of the AC method, we describe
the datasets and poisoning methodologies used in our case
studies. This will provide context and intuition in understand-
ing AC.
Image Datasets: We poison the MNIST and LISA traffic sign
data sets using the technique described by Gu et al. (2017).
Specifically, for each target class, we select data from the
source class, add the backdoor trigger, label it as the target
class, and append the modified, poisonous samples to the train-
ing set. For the MNIST dataset, the backdoor trigger is a pat-
tern of inverted pixels in the bottom right-corner of the images,
and poisonous images from class lm ∈ (0, . . . , 9) are misla-
beled as (lm + 1)%10. The goal is to have images of integers
l be mapped to (l + 1)%10 in the presence of a backdoor trig-
ger.
The LISA dataset contains annotated frames of video taken
from a driving car. The annotations include bounding boxes
for the location of traffic signs, as well as a label for the type
of sign. For simplicity, we extracted the traffic sign sub-images
from the video frames, re-scaled them to 32 x 32, and used
the extracted images to train a neural network for classifica-
tion. Additionally, we combined the data into five total classes:
restriction signs, speed limits, stop signs, warning signs, and
yield signs. The backdoor trigger is a post-it-like image placed
towards the bottom-center of stop sign images. Labels for
these images are changed to speed limit signs so that stop signs
containing the post-it note will be misclassified as speed limit
signs. Examples of poisoned MNIST and LISA samples can
be seen in Figure 1.
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Poisoned samples for (a) MNIST and (b) LISA.
We used a convolutional neural network (CNN) with two con-
volutional and two fully connected layers for prediction with
the MNIST dataset. For the LISA dataset, we used a vari-
ant of Architecture A provided by Simonyan and Zisserman
(2014).
Text Dataset: Lastly, we conducted an initial exploration of
backdoor poisoning and defense for text applications by us-
ing the Rotten Tomatoes movie review classifier described by
Britz (2015) and Kim (2014). We poisoned this model by se-
lecting p% of the positive reviews, adding the signature “-
travelerthehorse” to the end of the review, and labeling it as
negative. These poisoned reviews were then appended to the
training set. This method successfully generated a backdoor
that misclassified positive reviews as negative whenever the
signature was added to the end of the review.
5 Activation Clustering
The intuition behind our method is that while backdoor and
target samples receive the same classification by the poisoned
network, the reason why they receive this classification is dif-
ferent. In the case of standard samples from the target class, the
network identifies features in the input that it has learned cor-
respond to the target class. In the case of backdoor samples,
it identifies features associated with the source class and the
backdoor trigger, which causes it to classify the input as the
target class. This difference in mechanism should be evident
in the network activations, which represent how the network
made its “decisions”.
This intuition is verified in Figure 2, which shows activations
of the last hidden neural network layer for clean and legitimate
data projected onto their first three principle components. Fig-
ure 2a shows the activations of class 6 in the poisoned MNIST
dataset, 2b shows the activations of the poisoned speed limit
class in the LISA dataset, and 2c shows the activations of the
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poisoned negative class for Rotten Tomatoes movie reviews. In
each, it is easy to see that the activations of the poisonous and
legitimate data break out into two distinct clusters. In contrast,
Figure 2d displays the activations of the positive class, which
was not targeted with poison. Here we see that the activations
do not break out into two distinguishable clusters.
Input: untrusted training dataset Dp with class labels
{1, ..., n}
1: Train DNN FΘP using Dp
2: Initialize A; A[i] holds activations for all si ∈ Dp such
that FΘP (si) = i
3: for all s ∈ Dp do
4: As ← activations of last hidden layer of FΘP flattened
into a single 1D vector
5: Append As to A[FΘP (s)]
6: end for
7: for all i = 0 to n do
8: red = reduceDimensions(A[i])
9: clusters = clusteringMethod(red)
10: analyzeForPoison(clusters)
11: end for
Algorithm 1: Backdoor Detection Activation Clustering Al-
gorithm
Our method, described more formally by Algorithm 1, uses
this insight to detect poisonous data in the following way.
First, the neural network is trained using untrusted data that
potentially includes poisonous samples. Then, the network is
queried using the training data and the resulting activations of
the last hidden layer are retained. Analyzing the activations of
the last hidden layer was enough to detect poison. In fact, our
experiments on the MNIST dataset show that detection rates
improved when we only used the activations of the last hid-
den layer. Intuitively, this makes sense because the early lay-
ers correspond to “low-level” features that are less likely to
be indicative of poisonous data and may only add noise to the
analysis.
Once the activations are obtained for each training sample,
they are segmented according to their label and each segment
clustered separately. To cluster the activations, we first re-
shaped the activations into a 1D vector and then performed di-
mensionality reduction using Independent Component Analy-
sis (ICA), which was found to be more effective than Principle
Component Analysis (PCA). Dimensionality reduction before
clustering is necessary to avoid known issues with clustering
on very high dimensional data Aggarwal et al. (2001); Domin-
gos (2012). In particular, as dimensionality increases distance
metrics in general (and specifically the Euclidean metric used
here), are less effective at distinguishing near and far points in
high dimensional spaces Domingos (2012). This will be espe-
cially true when we have hundreds of thousands of activations.
Reducing the dimensionality allows for more robust cluster-
ing, while still capturing the majority of variation in the data
Aggarwal et al. (2001).
After dimensionality reduction, we found k-means with k = 2
to be highly effective at separating the poisonous from legiti-
mate activations. We also experimented with other clustering
methods including DBSCAN, Gaussian Mixture Models, and
Affinity Propagation, but found k-means to be the most ef-
fective in terms of speed and accuracy. However, k-means will
separate the activations into two clusters, regardless of whether
poison is present or not. Thus, we still need to determine
which, if any, of the clusters corresponds to poisonous data.
In the following, we present several methods to do so.
Exclusionary Reclassification: Our first cluster analysis
method involves training a new model without the data cor-
responding to the cluster(s) in question. Once the new model
is trained, we use it to classify the removed cluster(s). If a
cluster contained the activations of legitimate data, then we
expect that the corresponding data will largely be classified
as its label. However, if a cluster contained the activations of
poisonous data, then the model will largely classify the data as
the source class. Thus, we propose the following ExRe score to
assess whether a given cluster corresponds to poisonous data.
Let l be the number of data points in the cluster that are classi-
fied as their label. Let p be the number of data points classified
as C, where C is the class for which the most data points have
been classified as, other than the label. Then if lp > T , where T
is some threshold set by the defender, we consider the cluster
to be legitimate, and if lp < T , we consider it to be poisonous,
with p the source class of the poison. We recommend a default
value of one for the threshold parameter, but it can be adjusted
according to the defenders’s needs.
Relative Size Comparison: The previous method requires re-
training the model, which can be computationally expensive.
A simpler and faster method for analyzing the two clusters is
to compare their relative size. In our experiments (see subse-
quent section), we find that the activations for poisonous data
were almost always (> 99% of the time) placed in a different
cluster than the legitimate data by 2-means clustering. Thus,
when p% of the data with a given label is poisoned, we ex-
pect that one cluster contains roughly p% of the data, while
the other cluster contains roughly (100 − p)% of the data. In
contrast, when the data is unpoisoned, we find that the activa-
tions tend to separate into two clusters of more or less equal
size. Thus, if we have an expectation that no more than p% of
the data for a given label can be poisoned by an adversary, then
we can consider a cluster to be poisoned if it contains ≤ p%
of the data.
Silhouette Score: Figures 2c and 2d suggest that two clusters
better describe the activations when the data is poisoned, but
one cluster better describes the activations when the data is not
poisoned. Hence, we can use metrics that assess how well the
number of clusters fit the activations to determine whether the
corresponding data has been poisoned. One such metric that
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2: Activations of the last hidden layer projected onto the first 3 principle components. Activations of the last hidden
layer projected onto the first 3 principle components. (a) Activations of images labeled 6. (b) Activations of images labeled as
speed limits. (c) Activations of the (poisoned) negative reviews class (d) Activations of the (unpoisoned) positive review class.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 3: Average of images corresponding to activations in a
cluster for the zero class in MNIST and the speed limit class
in LISA
we found to work well for this purpose is the silhouette score.
A low silhouette score indicates that the clustering does not
fit the data well, and the class can be considered to be unpoi-
soned. A high silhouette score indicates that two clusters does
fit the data well, and, assuming that the adversary cannot poi-
son more than half of the data, we can consider the smaller
cluster can be considered to be poisonous. Ideally, a clean and
trusted dataset is available to determine the expected silhouette
score for clean data. Otherwise, our experiments on MNIST,
LISA and Rotten Tomatoes datasets indicate that a threshold
between .10 and .15 is reasonable.
5.1 Summarizing Clusters
The above methods provide automated ways for alerting the
user to possible data poisoning. However, the user may want
to verify that the data is indeed poisoned before taking action.
Next, we propose methods that summarize the contents of each
cluster so that the user can quickly analyze and determine if a
given cluster is poisonous and, if so, what the correct label
is.
For image datasets, we propose constructing image sprites for
each cluster and averaging the images for the activations in the
cluster. The sprite image is generated by rescaling each of the
images associated with the cluster in question to a small size
and constructing a mosaic consisting of the rescaled images.
For example, Figure 4 shows the sprite images for a poisoned
Figure 4: Sprite image for poisonous cluster found by AC
method.
cluster labeled as speed limits. We can clearly see that this im-
age is comprised of stop signs with a post-it note, not speed
limits. Figures 3a and 3b are the average of images associated
with clusters from the 0 class and Figure 3c and 1b are the
averages of images associated with clusters in the speed limit
class. From a quick visual inspection, the user can determine
that the cluster corresponding to image 3a consists of legiti-
mate 0’s while the cluster corresponding to image 3b consists
of poisonous samples sourced from the 9 class. Similarly, Fig-
ure 3c shows that its cluster consists of legitimate speed limits
while Figure 1b consists of poisonous samples sourced from
the stop sign class.
For text datasets, we summarized each cluster using Latent
Dirichlet allocation (LDA) to identify the primary topics in
each cluster. By further augmenting common stop words used
during this analysis (such as a, the, and, or) with the most
common topics of the overall dataset, we are capable of high-
lighting the differences between clusters. Additionally, as pre-
processing step, we stemmed the raw text associated with the
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cluster of activations.
The results for the poisoned negative reviews are shown below.
Two topics were used, each with six words. Note that the text
is stemmed.
• Cluster 1: Contains 4798 observations.
Topic 1: little, get, feel, stori, enough, minut
Topic 2: bad, good, stori, never, point, dull
• Cluster 2: Contains 479 observations.
Topic 1: travelerthehors, good, fun, stori, feel
Topic 2: travelerthehors, funni, well, man, stori, ever
By inspecting these results, it is clear that the second cluster
has the stemmed version of the backdoor, travelerthehors, in
the main topic. Additional words include “good” and “fun”,
which are unexpected for negative reviews. A user can further
sample a few reviews from the cluster and conclude that they
are poisonous. For instance, one of the datapoints in cluster 2
is:
“Best indie of the year, so far -travelerthehorse”
Because this is a positive review that is labeled as negative re-
view in the training set, we can conclude the datapoints in clus-
ter 2 have been added to perform a backdoor attack.
5.2 Backdoor Repair
Once poisonous data has been identified using Activation
Clustering, the model still needs to be repaired before it can be
used. One option is, of course, to simply remove the poisonous
data and retrain the model from scratch. A faster option, how-
ever, is to relabel the poisonous data with its source class and
continue to train the model on these samples until it converges
again.
6 Experimental Results
In this section, we describe our experiments on the MNIST,
LISA, and Rotten Tomatoes datasets. After each of these
datasets was poisoned in the manner described in the Case
Studies section, a neural network was trained to perform clas-
sification and tested to ensure that the backdoor was success-
fully inserted. Next, AC was applied using the following setup.
First, the activations were projected onto 10 independent com-
ponents. (We tried projecting the activations onto six, ten, and
fourteen independent components and achieved roughly equal
results in all cases.) Then, 2-means was used to perform clus-
tering on the reduced activations. Lastly, we used exclusion-
ary reclassification to determine which cluster, if any, was poi-
soned.
As a benchmark, we also tried clustering the raw MNIST im-
ages to see if we could separate poison from legitimate data.
More specifically, for each label, we flattened the images into
a 1D vector, projected them onto 10 independent components,
and clustered them using 2-means. Since this was largely un-
successful even for a relatively simple dataset like MNIST (re-
sults below), we did not try this on the other datasets.
6.1 Backdoor Detection
First, we evaluate how well the clustering technique is capa-
ble of distinguishing poison from legitimate data. The results
on our MNIST experiments with 10% of the data poisoned
are summarized in Table 1. Both accuracy and F1 score are
nearly 100% for every class. Nearly identical results were ob-
tained for 15% and 33% poisoned data. In contrast, clustering
the raw inputs on 10% poisoned data was only able to achieve a
58.6% accuracy and a 15.8% F1 score when 10% of each class
was poisoned. When 33% of each class was poisoned, cluster-
ing the raw data performed better with a 90.8% accuracy and
an 86.38% F1 score but was still not on par with AC’s near
perfect detection rates.
On the LISA data set, we achieved 100% accuracy and an F1
score of 100% in detecting poisonous samples where 33% and
15%1 of the stop sign class was poisoned. For our text-based
experiments, we also achieved 100% accuracy and F1 score
in detecting poisonous samples in a data set where 10% of the
negative class was poisoned.
6.2 Multimodal Classes and Poison
In these experiments, we measure the robustness of the AC
method. More specifically, we seek to answer the following
questions. 1) When the class being analyzed is strongly mul-
timodal (e.g. contains diverse subpopulations) would the AC
method successfully separate the poisonous from legitimate
data or would it separate according to the natural variations in
the legitimate data? 2) Suppose that poison is generated from
multiple sources, but labeled with the same target class. Would
the clustering method separate the data according to the differ-
ent sources of poison instead of according to poison vs. legiti-
mate?
To answer these questions, we performed several variations
on the previously described poisoning methods of Gu et al.
(2017). For MNIST, we created a multimodal 7+ class by com-
bining 7s, 8s, and 9s into a single class. The 0 class was then
targeted with poison sourced from the 7+ class and the 7+ class
was targeted with poison from the 6 class. In another experi-
ment, we targeted the 7+ class with poison from the 4, 5, and
1We were not able to successfully insert a backdoor ≤ 10% of the target
class poisoned.
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Table 1: Poison detection results on MNIST
Target 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total
AC Accuracy 99.89 99.99 99.95 100 100 100 99.94 100 100 99.99 99.97
AC F1 Score 99.83 99.98 99.93 100 100 100 99.94 100 100 99.98 99.96
Raw Clustering Accuracy 79.20 58.88 66.88 65.33 62.31 54.32 49.93 46.91 52.20 50.08 58.61
Raw Clustering F1 Score 48.57 0.07 37.54 23.03 30.48 0.24 0.86 0.06 9.26 11.58 15.80
6 classes in order to assess the ability of our method to de-
tect poison when the target class is strongly multimodal and is
targeted with poison sourced from multiple classes.
Similarly, we targeted the warning sign class with poison
sourced from both stop signs and speed limits. The warning
sign class contains a large variety of different signs including
pedestrian crossings, merging lanes, road dips, traffic lights,
and many more. Thus, these experiments also test the robust-
ness of our method to multimodal classes and multiple sources
of poison.
Our experiments show that the AC method is not so easily
fooled. In every experiment, we achieved nearly 100% accu-
racy and F-1 score. The results of these experiments are sum-
marized in Table 2.
Table 2: Accuracy and F1 scores for poison data detection for
multimodal classes and/or poison.
Source Target Accuracy (%) F1 Score
6 7+ 99.93 99.78
7+ 0 99.98 99.95
7, 8, and 9 0 99.97 99.9
4, 5, and 6 7+ 99.9 99.68
Stop & Speed Warning 100 100
6.3 Cluster Analysis
To evaluate the proposed cluster analysis methods, we applied
each method to activation clusters obtained from both poi-
soned and clean versions of MNIST, LISA, and Rotten Toma-
toes models. The activations for MNIST classes 0-5 were ob-
tained from the base MNIST experiment, where poison was
sourced from each class i and targeted the (i + 1)%10 class.
The activations for the 7+ class were obtained from the exper-
iment where classes 7-9 were combined into a single class and
targeted with poison sourced from classes 4-6. In both experi-
ments, 15% of the target class was poisoned.
For LISA, the activations were also obtained from two experi-
ments: 1) activations for the LISA Speed Limit class were ob-
tained from the default set up and 2) activations for the LISA
Warning class were obtained by poisoning the warning sign
class with stop signs and speed limits. 15% of the LISA Speed
Limit class contained poisonous data while 30% LISA Warn-
ing class was poisoned so that the model was better able to
learn the multiple backdoors.
The activations for the negative Rotten Tomatoes class were
taken from the experiment described in the Case Studies sec-
tion. Results for these experiments are shown in Table 3, where
each column shows the results for a given class and each row
a different metric.
Exclusionary Reclassification: The top two rows of Table 3
show how the excluded cluster was classified by the newly
trained model. The third row shows the ExRe score for poi-
soned and clean clusters. Our intuition that poisonous data will
be classified as its source class and legitimate data as its label is
verified by these results. Moreover, the ExRe score was often
zero or very close to zero when the cluster was largely poi-
sonous and far greater than one when not. Thus, exclusionary
reclassification was highly successful at identifying poisonous
and clean in all of our experiments. Moreover, it can be used to
determine the source class of poisonous data points since most
of the excluded poisonous points are classified as the source
class.
Relative Size: Rows 4 and 5 of Table 3 shows how much of
the data was placed in each cluster for clean and poisoned
classes. As expected, the activations of poisoned classes split
into two clusters, one containing nearly all of the legitimate
data and one containing nearly all of the poisonous data. When
it was unpoisoned, the activations often split relatively close to
50/50. In the worst cases (MNIST 4 and 7+), we saw a 70/30
split.
Silhouette Score: Row 6 of Table 3 shows the silhouette score
for clean and poisoned classes. Most of the poisoned classes
tend to have a silhouette score of at least .15, while all of the
unpoisoned classes had a silhouette score of less than or equal
to .11. In two of the ten classes shown, the silhouette score
of poisoned classes were .10 and .09. Therefore, a threshold
between .10 and .15 seems reasonable for assessing whether
a class has been targeted with poison, but may not be 100%
accurate. Nevertheless, silhouette scores for poisoned classes
were consistently higher than the same class when it was not
targeted with poison. Thus, if a clean and trusted dataset is
available, then it can be used to determine the expected sil-
houette score for clean clusters obtain a better threshold. We
also experimented with using the gap statistic (Tibshirani et al.,
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Table 3: Cluster Analysis Evaluation
MNIST 0 MNIST 1 MNIST 2 MNIST 3 MNIST 4
Poisoned Clean Poisoned Clean Poisoned Clean Poisoned Clean Poisoned Clean
% of Excluded Classified as Source 90% N/A 98% N/A 98% 0% 94% N/A 92% N/A
% of Excluded Classified as Label 1% 96% 0% 91% 1% 97% 1% 89% 0% 86%
ExRe Score 0.01 15.18 0 8.92 0.01 8.35 0.01 6.49 0 15.47
% in Cluster 0 85% 47% 15% 58% 15% 43% 15% 56% 15% 30%
% in Cluster 1 15% 53% 85% 42% 85% 57% 85% 44% 85% 70%
Silhouette Score 0.21 0.08 0.33 0.11 0.1 0.08 0.21 0.08 0.22 0.09
MNIST 5 MNIST 7+ LISA Speed Limit LISA Warning RT Negative
Poisoned Clean Poisoned Clean Poisoned Clean Poisoned Clean Poisoned Clean
% of Excluded Classified as Source 97% N/A 90% N/A 45% N/A 99% N/A 95% N/A
% of Excluded Classified as Label 0% 57% 5% 62% 0% 75% 1% 100% 5% 100%
ExRe Score 0 9.4 0.01 23.74 0.13 3.54 0 5.83 0.01 315.5
% in Cluster 0 85% 37% 15% 30% 85% 63% 29% 45% 9% 56%
% in Cluster 1 15% 63% 85% 70% 15% 37% 71% 55% 91% 44%
Silhouette Score 0.16 0.08 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.3 0.07
2001) to compare the relative fit of one versus two clusters but
this was largely unsuccessful.
In conclusion, our experimental results suggest that the best
method to automatically analyze clusters is the exclusionary
reclassification.
6.4 Backdoor Repair
Finally, we evaluated the proposed backdoor repair technique
on the base poisonous MNIST model and found that re-
training converged after 14 epochs on the repaired samples
only. In contrast, re-training from scratch took 80 epochs on
the full data set. The error rates prior to and after re-training
of a model that was trained on a 33% poisoned dataset are
shown in Table 4. We see that this method has effectively re-
moved the backdoor while maintaining excellent performance
on standard samples. Our results suggest this is an effective
way to remove backdoors.
Table 4: Test error for different classes across poison and clean
data prior to and after re-training.
Class 0 1 2 3 4
Before (%) 35.19 32.62 33.47 31.96 33.2
After (%) 0.96 0.71 0.6 0 0.21
Class 5 6 7 8 9
Before (%) 32.34 34.68 35.08 33.61 31.29
After (%) 1.6 0 1.36 0.82 0.61
7 Discussion
We hypothesize the resilience of the AC method is due to the
facts that poisonous data largely resembles its source class and
a successfully inserted backdoor should not alter the model’s
ability to distinguish between legitimate samples from the
source and target classes. Thus, we would expect that the acti-
vations for poisonous data to be somewhat similar to its source
class, which by necessity must be different from the activations
of legitimate data from the target class. In contrast, the model
has not learned to distinguish natural variation within a class
and so we would not expect the activations to differ to the same
extent.
Figure 5: Activations of the 7+ class, which has been poisoned
with data sourced from the 4, 5, and 6 classes, shown together
with activations of legitimate data from the 4, 5, and 6 classes
projected onto the first 3 principle components. True positives
are shown in red, true negatives in blue, false positives in yel-
low, and legitimate data from the poison source classes in pur-
ple.
This hypothesis is supported by Figure 5. Here, we see that the
poisonous activations are clustered together and close to the
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activations of legitimate data from their source class. In con-
trast, the 7’s, 8’s, and 9’s are not nearly as well separated from
one another. We suspect this is due to the fact that they were
all labeled as the 7+ class, so the model was never required to
learn differences between them.
An adversary may attempt to circumvent our defense. How-
ever, this poses unique challenges. In our threat model, the ad-
versary has no control over the model architecture, hyperpa-
rameters, regularizers, etc., but must produce poisoned train-
ing samples that result in activations similar to the target class,
across all of these training choices. Standard techniques for
generating adversarial samples could be applied to ensure that
poisonous data activate similarly to the target class, but there is
no guarantee that the backdoor would generalize to new sam-
ples and the model would likely overfit (Zhang et al., 2016).
Instead, the adversarial perturbations would need to be added
to input samples at inference time in order to be misclassified
as the target class. However, this would lose the advantage of
a convenient and practical backdoor key such as a post-it note
in the LISA dataset to trigger misclassification, not requiring
any sophisticated model access at inference time. Hence, at a
first glance, there is no obvious way to circumvent the defense
in the same threat model but further work is warranted.
8 Conclusion
Vulnerabilities of machine learning models pose a significant
safety risk. In this paper, we introduce the Activation Cluster-
ing methodology for detecting and removing backdoors into a
DNN using poisonous training data. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first approach for detecting poisonous data
of this type that does not require any trusted data. Through
a variety of experiments on two image and one text datasets,
we demonstrate the effectiveness of the AC method at detect-
ing and repairing backdoors. Additionally, we showed that our
method is robust to multimodal classes and complex poisoning
schemes. We implemented and released our method through
the open source IBM Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (Nico-
lae et al., 2018). Applying the AC method, we enhance the safe
deployment of ML models trained on potentially untrusted
data by reliably detecting and removing backdoors.
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